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Inflation Aversion in the European Union:  






Our study seeks to put the assumptions of German Stability Culture to the test. The concept 
is a core legitimizing element of economic policy discourse in Germany and used regularly 
to juxtapose Germany and northern Europe and the euro area periphery. Using 
Eurobarometer surveys we construct a measurement for Stability Culture which is based 
on the priority assigned to the fight against inflation. Our empirical analysis covers the 
2002 to 2010 timespan and includes 27 European Union Member States. Our results show 
that the distinction between northern states with an allegedly strong and southern states 
with an allegedly weak Stability Culture is a myth. Controlling for actual inflation, we find 
that the northern Member States with an allegedly high Stability Culture are less concerned 
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The concept of Stability Culture has been manipulated by German Christian Democrat 
politicians and a range of German policy makers both as a diagnosis of and remedy to the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis (Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013). Stability Culture 
refers to a common policy perspective the primary concern of which is low inflation (price 
stability). The Sovereign Debt Crisis, so the argument propagated by Stability Culture 
champions goes, was brought on by a failure to establish a firm German-style Stability 
Culture across the Eurozone. In the words of the former Bundesbank president Helmut 
Schlesinger1 (2012), the crisis can be identified as a problem of ‘different mentalities’ and 
the omission in the Maastricht Treaty of a requirement that ‘all Member States have the 
same Stability Culture’. This diagnostic is echoed by the demand of the AfD (Alternative 
for Germany, 2014) — an anti-euro party established in 2013 which achieved almost 5 
percent of the vote in the national parliamentary election of the same year – for an ‘ordered 
break-up of the current Eurozone and the establishment of stable currency unions of 
countries with a similar Stability Culture’. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
official cure to the Sovereign Debt Crisis strikes a similar, though non-secessionist, note. 
In May 2010 she declared herself guardian of the Stability Culture: ‘I will take care that 
we make sure together with our partners that the whole of Europe commits herself to a new 
Stability Culture’ (Merkel 2010a). In so doing, cultural atonement was considered a 
priority: ‘My focus will be for us to make clear that the Stability Culture has to improve’ 
(Merkel 2010b). Merkel’s project of a pan-European Stability Culture, a distinctly German 
project, does little to shroud the fact that Stability Culture discourse is inherently 
discriminatory and divisive. It pits allegedly ‘good’ Stability Culture countries (such as 
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Germany, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands)2 against allegedly ‘bad’ countries lacking 
a Stability Culture (such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy). 
 
It would be precipitous to dismiss the discourse on Stability Culture as political window-
dressing (although it has elements of this). The promotion of Stability Culture by German 
politicians has far-reaching policy implications, notably regarding the prescription of fiscal 
consolidation for the sake of price stability. Despite its role in guiding policy responses to 
the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, its axiom of cultural superiority / inferiority has not 
been subject to a comprehensive investigation. Beyond scarce evidence presented from 
summary statistics (Collins and Gavanzzi 1992; Hayo 1998), a systematic analysis of the 
variation of Stability Culture in the European Union (EU) is still wanting. Our analysis 
seeks to address this empirical blind spot. This article will proceed as follows: First, we 
explore the history and politics of Stability Culture. The subsequent section discusses our 
measurement of inflation aversion, model specifications and data. We then present the 
empirical results and robustness tests and discuss our main findings. Using Eurobarometer 
surveys we demonstrate that the population in the core countries of the alleged Stability 
Culture stronghold are less inflation averse than in the rest of the EU.  
 
The history and politics of Stability Culture 
 
We understand the term Stability Culture as a paradigm of price stability shared by 
politicians, central bankers and the population at large which is considered to constitute a 
vital framework for the market economy and the preservation of social peace (see Dyson 
2000). ‘Stable money’, so the argument goes, ‘is the foundational contract of democracy’ 
(Brüderle 2013). In this study we focus on Stability Culture as political culture, and 
therefore on public opinion in the EU member states, not the views of political elites. At 
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its core, Stability Culture is not an elite phenomenon. Rather it is firmly anchored within 
political and socio-economic culture. In its origins, this ‘culture of stability’ is considered 
by many to be a fundamental characteristic of German political culture (Mertes 1994: 6). 
Along similar lines, Richter (1991) understands Stability Culture as a ‘social concept’ 
anchored in the consciousness of the population. 
 
Stability Culture has also been considered a key element of the success or failure of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (see Bofinger et al. 1998). German architects of 
EMU insisted that the Eurozone had to be founded on a durable ‘stability-orientation’ 
(dauerhafte Stabilitätsorientierung) (Dyson 2014). This ordo-liberal blueprint for 
monetary integration goes beyond political elites. Hayo (1998) claims that the design of 
the European Central Bank (ECB) is merely one part of a stability regime that must be 
reinforced with public attitudes in favour of price stability. Public opinion is thus said to 
become a ‘significant precondition’ of the success and longevity of EMU (ibid. 244). 
 
This study — to the best of our knowledge the first to systematically investigate actual 
inflation aversion of individuals (Stability Culture) across EU countries – also functions as 
a much needed reality check. The widespread German discourse on Stability Culture in the 
context of the ongoing Eurozone crisis, does not stop at the (in)capacities of various 
national political elites, but can also involve sweeping statements about national 
populations at large. Three well-known examples of this sweeping discourse include: the 
portrait of ‘lazy Southerners’ and ‘efficient Northerners’ in former Bundesbank Executive 
Board member Thilo Sarrazin’s 2012 bestseller Europe doesn’t need the euro (2015); the 
campaign mounted by the high circulation German tabloid newspaper Bild against ‘billions 
for greedy Greeks’; and Chancellor Merkel’s portrait of ‘southern Europeans’ as work-shy 
and too fond of holidays and early retirement (EU Observer 19 May 2011). The concept of 
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Stability Culture is not confined to Germany’s borders — see, for example, the views of 
Sweden’s former Minister of Finance, Anders Borg (Scocco 2015) — but the portrait of 
Germans as inflation averse is particularly widespread (e.g., Rehn 2012; La Tribune 
22.01.2015; Financial Times 14.8.2013, The Economist 15.11.2013). 
 
The policy prescriptions of Stability Culture entail a mantra of fiscal restraint with the aim 
of achieving price stability. One of the alleged by-products of a Keynesian approach to 
demand management is higher inflation. Cottarelli et al. (1998), for instance, argue both 
deficit and debt levels have a significant effect on inflation. Yet, a positive deficit/debt-
inflation correlation has also been challenged by a number of scholars, who see at best a 
tentative link. Catao and Terrones (2005), for example, argue that the relationship does not 
apply to low-inflation advanced economies. We argue that the economic accuracy of this 
alleged transition mechanism is only secondary for our analysis:  at the heart of the 
construction of the pan-European Stability Culture is the claim that high deficits cause 
inflation (cf. EMI 1996). This assertion was repeated with the reformed Stability and 
Growth Pact3 (Gonzalez-Paramo 2005), in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 recession (Stark 
2010), and in the context of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (Bundesbank 2013). 
Indeed, the German debate on (monetary policy) responses to the Eurozone crisis is framed 
by the concern over rising inflation, from eurobonds to the ECB’s quantitative easing bond-
buying — referred to by the most-read German newspaper as ‘the ECB tsunami’ (Bild 
2.2.2015). In the on-going debate on the speed and scope of budgetary consolidation 
efforts, the link between fiscal profligacy and rising inflation has been presented as 
justification for fiscal consolidation. In a Financial Times opinion-piece, for example, the 
German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble stressed the need for ‘expansionary fiscal 
consolidation’, stressing that Germany was ‘more preoccupied with the implications of 
excessive deficits and the dangers of high inflation’ (Schäuble 2010).  
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Schäuble’s justification for Germany’s alleged preoccupation with inflation is in line with 
the founding myth of Stability Culture, dating back to the collective memory of the 
hardship and suffering the German population experienced during the hyper-inflations of 
1921-23 and the pent-up inflation of 1936-48. This experience resulted in people haunted 
by the spectre of ‘laundry baskets full of money’ (Billerbeck 2015) — ‘the fear of 
hyperinflation is printed in the German genome’ (Brüderle 2011). The link between 
Hitler’s rise to power and Germany’s inflation drama has been widely discredited (Blyth 
2013: 59ff)4, notably as the years leading to the Third Reich were marked by recession 
which was linked with deflation and high unemployment. Singling out the German 
experience of runaway price-rises in the 1920s furthermore ignores that other countries 
share ‘memories of high inflation’ (Ehrmann and Tzamourani 2009). Comparing the 
German hyperinflation of the early 1920s to 64 other periods of worldwide hyperinflation 
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it is evident that the experience of the Weimar 
Republic is hardly exceptional (Hanke and Krus 2012). And yet singling out the 
preoccupation with inflation of the German population and a significant section of its 
political class appears comparatively distinctive, exaggerated and, it might be argued, 
extreme (see Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013). 
 
Given the strong presence of the term Stability Culture in European politics, it comes as a 
surprise that no study to date, as far as we are aware, has set out to test the premise on 
which it rests. Are the populations of Southern European countries less inflation averse 
than the alleged model pupils of Stability Culture?  
 
Quantifying Stability Culture as inflation aversion 
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At the heart of Stability Culture is a concern about price stability. As the preceding 
discussion suggests, the fear of inflation — inflation aversion — has thus been a central 
yardstick for a country’s Stability Culture. Individuals, however, seem to have difficulties 
to perceive price developments correctly and are often unable to assess actual inflation 
properly.5 The discrepancy between actual inflation and the fear of inflation during the 
sovereign debt crisis is a case in point. Draghi’s frustration (2014) with what he calls the 
‘perverse angst’ of inflation in Germany should be seen against the backdrop of a monetary 
policy community worrying about low inflation turning into outright deflation (Financial 
Times 24.1.2014). Thus, since it is not the actual knowledge about inflation rates that 
matters for stability culture but rather perception, the main empirical task is to measure 
inflation aversion.6  
 
Three main approaches to measuring inflation aversion can be found in the literature: 
 
1) Inflation aversion can be captured by the preferences about inflation of policy 
makers. Krause and Mendez (2005) and Heinemann et al. (2014) base their measurement 
on revealed preferences obtained from macroeconomic data. This policy maker centred 
measurement is then thought to reveal the emphasis policy makers place on inflation 
stabilisation. LeMay-Boucher and Rommerskirchen (2014) use ‘economic orthodoxy’ (a 
variable in the Comparative Manifesto Project) to measure governments’ commitment to 
low inflation as based on party programmes. Since the present study is concerned with the 
inflation culture of the population, not political elites, we shun away from using a similar 
measurement. 
 
2) Inflation aversion can also be modelled as the sensitivity of wellbeing to inflation. 
Di Tella et al. (2001) examine how respondents' reports of their wellbeing vary with 
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national levels of unemployment and inflation. Collins and Giazanzzi (1992) adopt a 
similar approach but with two notable differences. First, they are interested in how inflation 
and unemployment affect respondents’ assessment of their general economic condition, not 
of their happiness. Secondly, and more importantly, instead of using real inflation and 
unemployment rates, the respondents’ perceptions of changes in price levels and 
unemployment are taken as the independent variables. A further ‘indirect way’ to measure 
inflation aversion is to analyse the relationship between a country’s inflation performance 
and the popularity of governments (cf. Hibbs 1982) or satisfaction with the practice of 
democracy (Clarke et al. 1993). Whilst all of these studies offer insight into the dynamics 
of a population’s attitudes towards inflation, they have the drawback of presenting an 
indirect measurement of inflation aversion. 
 
Hayo (1998, for a similar approach see Hayo 2010) uses a variant of the sensitivity analysis 
by examining the sensitivity of public inflation aversion to a rise in inflation (in single 
country regressions without control variables). Countries with a strong Stability Culture, 
like Germany are found to be more sensitive to rises in inflation. We find this approach 
inappropriate for a simple reason:  populations can show high inflation aversion 
irrespective of the actual level of inflation and changes to the inflation rate (see Draghi’s 
comment above).  
 
3) A third approach is to ask individuals survey questions specifically about inflation. 
Farvaque and Mihailov (2009) use the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2006 
survey of 33 countries concerning the role of government in society. Specifically, their 
measure of inflation aversion is based on the answer to the question whether respondents 
‘think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to keep prices under 
control’. Yet it is questionable whether the implicitly assumed inflation aversion and 
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government responsibility are solidly linked. Respondents might be of the opinion that 
governments are in charge of keeping prices under control without being particularly 
inflation averse or worried about inflation. What is more, the formulation ‘under control’ 
is sufficiently vague for individuals with a high tolerance for inflation rates to give a 
positive answer. One can also distinguish between surveys that rank inflation against other 
economic issues and those that juxtapose inflation and non-economic issues. On the former, 
Scheve (2004) and Jayadev (2006) use the 1996 version of the ISSP survey. Inflation 
aversion is based on giving inflation priority when asked whether governments should fight 
unemployment or inflation. This indicator explicitly relates to the kind of Phillips curve 
mechanisms discussed below. Other studies use survey questions about the priority of the 
fight against inflation relative to non-economic values, specifically ‘maintaining order in 
the nation’, ‘giving people more say in important government decisions’ and ‘protecting 
freedom of speech’ (Hayo 1998; Ehrmann and Tzamourani 2009; Ehrmann 2014).  
 
Our approach examines the priority assigned to controlling inflation in relation to both 
economic and non-economic goals. We base our analysis on Eurobarometer surveys where 
respondents are asked about the two policy priorities currently facing their country with 
inflation/maintaining price stability being one possible option. Specifically, various 
Eurobarometer surveys from 2002-2010 (cf. Appendix) include the question: ‘What do you 
think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?’. 
Inflation aversion is assumed to be strong if ‘rising prices/inflation’ was among the issues 
named.7 Inflation as a policy concern thus competes directly with other economic and non-
economic goals. Contemporary data that pits inflation explicitly against unemployment, 
similar to Scheve (2004), is unfortunately not available for our purposes given that we are 
interested, first, in the post-2001 period and, second, in tracking inflation aversion across 
all EU members over time.8 We should note that Scheve’s (2004) results do not relate to 
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our main research question, as the underlying data does not allow for testing systematic 
differences between countries.9  
 
The absence of survey results on individual concerns about (rising) deficit/debt levels 
prevents us from analyzing the fiscal component of Stability Culture. Given that, as we 
argue above, Stability Culture emanates first and foremost from inflation aversion, this 
should not bias our analysis. At the same time, we welcome future research into the fiscal 
dimension of Stability Culture beyond single-country studies (e.g., Hayo and Neumeyer 
2013; Heinemann and Henninghausen 2012). Further analysis (and new data) is also 
needed to investigate the preferences of political elites, capital and labour, and how these 
pertain to a country’s Stability Culture (cf. Posen 1993; Franzese 2001). New data would 
furthermore be needed to move beyond a binary understanding of inflation aversion, where 
individuals are either inflation averse (1) or not (0). What is more, we are likely to miss 
individual country and year specific factors, such as the emergence of pressing issues that 
may shift policy concerns. Since our measure of inflation aversion is based on the ranking 
of competing policy issues, a country-specific environmental catastrophe or foreign policy 
conflict may well appear to reduce inflation aversion. 
 
Our observations include 27 Member States, with the EU-15 being included since 2002 
and the new EU Member States since 2005. This leaves us with 197,742 observations at 
the individual level and 176 observations at the country level. Table 1 reports descriptive 
statistics of the inflation aversion measure by country between 2002 and 2010, taking the 
mean inflation aversion (since 2005 for the new EU Member States). Some interesting 
observations suggest themselves. First, there are large differences in the average relative 
inflation aversion between countries, from a low of 3.1 per cent of respondents in Sweden 
to a high of 34.69 per cent of respondents in Latvia. Second, it appears that German 
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respondents (mean 17.30 per cent) are less inflation averse than Greek ones (mean 21.21 
per cent), whereas there is little difference between the inflation aversion of Eurozone 
Member States (mean 20.73 per cent) vs. non-Eurozone Member States (mean 19.67 per 
cent). Figure 1 summarises the distribution of inflation aversion (2002-2010) with a box 
plot. For each country, the box contains the inter-quartile range (a measure of statistical 
dispersion) of inflation aversion, the medians are marked with dark lines, the whiskers 
indicate the range of the more extreme values and the dots mark any outliers. Overall, 
annual inflation aversion ranges from 1.27 per cent (Sweden in 2005) to 70.93 (Latvia in 
2008). Figure 1 highlights substantial variation across countries as well as within countries. 
Note however that only 4 per cent of the variation in inflation aversion is due to between-
country variation. Despite clear differences between countries, inflation aversion in the 
time period under scrutiny follows two trends:  first, the decline in inflation aversion up to 
the eruption of the financial crisis; and second, the subsequent soaring of inflation aversion 
post 2008.  
 
It is likely that the respondents’ inflation aversion will be influenced by rising prices. We 
compute the rank correlation coefficients between both variables for each of the 27 
countries. We rank the countries according to their mean inflation aversion between 2002 
and 2010 and compare that ranking to the ranking according to their mean inflation rate in 
the same time period. We use the Spearman rank correlation to assess the correlation of 
these rankings. Based on this test (r = 0.57, n = 27) there seems to be a clear correlation 
between inflation aversion and actual inflation in the European Union. On the overall 
country level, the correlation between annual national inflation aversion and national 
inflation rates points to a similar relationship (r = 0.52, n = 194) as does, albeit less strongly 
so, the correlation coefficient on the individual level (r = 0.2, n = 192,755). Figure 2 further 
illustrates the link between inflation and inflation aversion. Yet as can be seen from Table 
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1, in some countries the discrepancy between the real inflation context and the mean 
inflation aversion is quite stark.10 Taking the ranking of inflation aversion tells us about the 
context-specific inflation aversion, but is of little use to determine the political economy 
determinants of inflation aversion beyond correlational findings. In order to investigate the 
dynamics of inflation aversion, it is desirable to control for the current economic context 
as well as for political and individual level factors. 
 
Data and Econometric Model 
 
To analyse the determinants of cross-country variation in public inflation aversion, we 
examine survey-based measures of inflation aversion in the 27 EU Member States between 
2002 and 2010 as described above. The non-Eurozone EU countries serve as control group. 
This empirical analysis will be carried out on both the individual and the country level. A 
detailed description of all variables can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Dependent variables 
On the individual level, INFLATION AVERSION is a binary variable taking the value 1 
if the respondent is inflation averse and 0 otherwise. On the country level INFLATION 
AVERSION takes the percentage of respondents of a country in a given year naming the 
fight against inflation as one of their country’s two main policy priorities. One of the 
strengths of our analysis is that it takes both individuals as well as whole countries as units 
of analysis. Public opinion studies are known often to yield disparate estimates depending 
on which unit of analysis is used. Testing our hypothesis on both levels thus renders our 




To control for the Stability Culture hypothesis, we construct country group dummies for 
the allegedly wayward states of EMU (SOUTH: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Greece) 
as well as the alleged model pupils of Stability Culture (NORTH: Germany, Austria, 
Netherlands and Finland).11 We furthermore control for EMU membership to test whether 
monetary union has an impact on individuals’ inflation aversion. The variable EURO, 
taking the value 1 if a country is a member of the Eurozone / if the respondent lives in a 
country that is a member of the single currency union. If joining the common currency area 
would indeed lead to a ‘stability culture across Europe’, as attested by the former German 
Finance Minister Theo Waigel (1997), the variable EURO should have a positive effect on 
inflation aversion. In this line of argument, the convergence of popular inflation aversion 
is considered to underpin the political sustainability of EMU, as it ‘depends on the 
consolidation of the Member States into a political community based on shared beliefs’ 
(Sadeh 2009: 545). Again, we argue that the consolidation of such ‘political community’ 
is not confined to political elites, but must encompass the population at large (see also 
Anderson 2006: 114-115). The assumption of EMU consensus on the importance of low 
inflation is compatible with both a ‘top-down’ process and a ‘bottom-up’ process of mass 
public opinion (cf. Risse-Kappen 1991). Public opinion was as much a factor in shaping 
EMU accession (e.g., Gabel 1998) as it was to be won over (e.g., Collignon and Schwarzer 
2003). In both scenarios, the German narrative of Stability Culture would expect public 
opinion in Eurozone countries to place a higher priority in the ‘fight against inflation’.  
 
We further control for a host of factors at both the individual and the national level. At the 
individual level we include the controls AGE (age of respondent), UNEMPLOYED 
(unemployment status dummy), EDUCATION (years of education), and MALE (gender 
dummy). Based on the Barro-Gordon Model (Barro and Gordon 1983), numerous studies 
have suggested a trade-off between inflation and unemployment (e.g., Akerlof et al. 1996). 
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Scheve (2004) finds that inflation aversion decreases with the rise in unemployment, 
arguing that this was broadly consistent with the specification of utility/loss functions in 
the literature (see also di Tella et al. 2001). Inflation has significant redistributive effects. 
In an attempt to group those disadvantaged and advantaged from inflationary policies — 
and therefore those more or less inflation averse — it is helpful to look at four key 
individual-level characteristics: age, employment status, education, and gender. First, 
‘those on fixed incomes and limited political clout, such as pensioners or dole recipients, 
generally lose out’ (Burda and Wyplosz 2005: 417). Both groups are likely to be more 
sensitive to a decrease in the real value of money with unemployment benefits and pensions 
not being automatically inflation-adjusted (cf. Farvaque and Mihailov 2009). Women are 
in more volatile employment situations than men which may be why they tend to place less 
priority on curbing inflation than men (although see Bryan and Venkatu 2001). Education 
should be considered a common indicator of ‘both labor market skills and cognitive 
abilities’ (Scheve 2004: 11). It is however not clear how education would play into inflation 
aversion (Jayadev 2006). On the one hand, less educated individuals may be more 
concerned about unemployment (vs. inflation). On the other hand, more educated 
individuals may find it easier to protect themselves against the costs of inflation, generating 
a negative relationship between education and inflation aversion. 
 
At the national level we control for the broader economic climate and include the variables 
INFLATION12 (the inflation rate), ΔGDP (the change in gross domestic product) and 
DEBT (national debt to GDP ratio). We include the debt to GDP ratio to control for the 
allegedly inflationary effects of (unsustainable) debt levels (e.g., Suzuki 1993). 
Governments, so the conventional wisdom goes, would push for inflationary policies to 
reduce their debt burdens. In monetary union the inflation-debt link is slightly different. 
Here, according to the popular concern, unsustainable debt burdens would oblige the ECB 
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to act as a lender of last resort buying government bonds. This would increase the money 
stock and increase the risk of inflation. In both scenarios, outside or inside EMU, high debt 
levels are thought to indicate a bigger risk for inflationary policies and thus increase the 
inflation aversion of a population. The variable INFLATION controls for the assumed 
positive link between actual inflation and inflation aversion. The measures for 
unemployment and GDP growth further control for the economic climate which is likely 
to influence inflation aversion. 
 
Econometric model  
For the individual level model we use a logit regression appropriate for the binary nature 
of our dependent variable. Merging individual-level observations with country-level 
economic factors introduces the possibility that disturbances will be correlated across 
countries. Moulton (1990) shows that standard errors from a usual maximum likelihood 
estimation can be biased seriously downwards if the disturbances are correlated within the 
groupings that are used to merge individual-level with country-level data. We therefore 
cluster standard errors by country. This requires the weaker assumption that errors are 
independent across countries but not necessarily across survey respondents within a given 
country. Unit root tests suggest that the series in all models is stationary. 
 
In order to explore the determinants of inflation aversion at the country level we use random 
effects. Fixed-effects estimations may be better suited in time-series cross-sectional data 
with a time series of T→30 (Judson and Owen 1999) — our panel covers only 10 years at 
most (less for new EU Member States). To test formally which model is more appropriate 
for the data analysis, we conducted the Hausman test — both for the full EU and for the 
Eurozone panel he which is usually applied in the literature (Hsiao 1986). The Hausman 
test examines the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the random-effects 
estimator are not systematically different from the ones estimated by the fixed-effects 
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estimator. Results suggest that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected  (Prob>χ2=0.217 for 
the EU model and Prob>χ2=0.756 for the Eurozone model) and so we choose the random 
effects model, which gives efficient and consistent estimates of coefficients in our case. A 
further advantage of random effects models is that we are able to estimate time-invariant 
dummies. The very core of our empirical analysis consists of testing the statistical 
significance of three variables that do not change, or change little, over time — namely 
NORTH, SOUTH and EURO.13 The confirmation of the use of a random effects model is 
in line with our intuition that inflation aversion is influenced by differences across 
countries. Our main model, where matrices I and E comprise individual and economic 
controls, is as follows: 
 




The logit regression coefficient estimates of the individual level model are reported in 
Table 2 and random effects coefficient of the country level model are reported in Table 3. 
Our results strongly suggest that the distinction between northern states with an allegedly 
strong, and southern states with an allegedly weak Stability Culture, as expressed in high 
and low inflation aversion, is a myth. In no specification is the SOUTH variable either 
individually or jointly significant. Conversely, the NORTH variable suggests that this 
country group puts less priority on the fight against inflation (between 6 and 10% 
depending on the model). 
 
The results of all models suggest that the economic context has a substantial impact on the 
public’s inflation aversion. As expected, the inflation rate has a strong and significant 
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impact on inflation aversion (cf. Berlemann 2014; Ehrmann and Tzamourani 2012; Scheve 
2004). We find that higher debt levels lead to an increase in inflation aversion, whereas 
GDP growth reduces inflation aversion (yet only for our country-level models). The 
negative and significant coefficient for the UNEMPLOYMENT variable for the Eurozone 
subsample in the Eurozone logit and both fixed effect models lends credence to the view 
that high unemployment rates lead to a decrease in inflation aversion. This is line with the 
existing literature. Scheve (2004), for instance, argues that as unemployment rises, 
reducing unemployment becomes a greater priority, achieving which makes rising inflation 
potentially more acceptable. However, we find that on the individual-level, being 
unemployed increases the probability of being inflation averse by 1%. Berlemann (2014) 
shows a similar mismatch between the sign of individual unemployment and national 
unemployment figures. Our results suggest that less educated individuals are less inflation 
averse than more educated individuals which is in line with, inter alia, van Lelyveld (1999) 
and Easterly and Fischer (2001). For every year of education, the probability of being 
inflation averse is reduced by 1 percent. Contrary to Scheve (2004) and Jayadev (2006), 
we find that women are more concerned about price stability then men, which is in line 
with Berlemann (2014) and Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2012). However, surprisingly, and 
contrary to the existing literature, the AGE variable, while statistically significant, has a 
negative impact on inflation aversion. This result still holds when we split the variable into 
aggregate groups or include the squared term to model a non-linear relationship. Its 
marginal effect is small so age does not seem to be a main driver of inflation aversion. Our 
finding thus suggests that the ageing of national populations should not increase inflation 
aversion. Furthermore, this result is interesting as it contradicts the view that because 
inflation aversion is a function of a population’s experience with high inflation, popular 
inflation aversion should decrease with years of price stability (Ehrmann and Tzamourani 
2009, although see van Lelyveld 1999). This is not the case: our data shows that across the 
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EU, inflation aversion is fairly constant over the timespan of this analysis and reached a 9 
year high during the Great Recession; and that the younger generation is slightly more 
likely to be inflation averse than the very old, many of whom lived through periods of high 
inflation. This finding runs counter to Ehrmann and Tzamourani’s concern (2009: 21) that 
the ‘mandate could possibly erode over time, due to the central banks’ own successes in 
taming inflation, thus lowering the sensitivity of the public towards rising prices’. 
 
The marginal effects of our logit model suggest that that inhabitants of the Eurozone are 
11 per cent more likely to be inflation averse than inhabitants of EU Member States that 
have not adopted the single currency. This result is confirmed by our country-level model. 
This in itself is not sufficient evidence to claim convergence towards a policy consensus 
on the importance of price stability within the Eurozone as discussed in the literature. There 
are several other possible explanations of higher inflation aversion in the Eurozone. For 
instance an increase in inflation aversion may be linked to mistrust in the Central Bank in 
EMU Member States.14 To test this, we split our individual-level Eurozone sample into two 
groups: the first indicated that they do not trust or tend not to trust the ECB; the second 
noting trust for the central bank. If we split the whole EU sample according to trust in the 
ECB results are virtually identical. Our results, presented in Table 4, strongly suggest that 
the positive impact of Eurozone membership on inflation aversion is not due to mistrust in 
the Central Bank. When using the entire EU sample and including the variable EURO in 
both EU samples (split again according to trust of the ECB), the coefficients for EURO are 
statistically identical to those of the full model presented in Table 2. Results from these 
two sub-groups furthermore corroborate our main finding challenging the Stability Culture 
narrative. Respondents in the alleged stronghold of Stability Culture are less inflation 





We furthermore test whether our model may be biased due to the inclusion of the period of 
the Great Recession (2008-2010).  Has the financial crisis changed the way in which our 
independent variables affect inflation aversion? We know from the literature that public 
opinion is not necessarily a constant function but may display non-linearities, especially in 
the event of political or economic crises (e.g., Bernhard and Leblang 2005, Ojeda 2014). 
We re-estimate our main models both at the country and at the individual level for the 
2002-2007 period only (see appendix:  Tables 1a and 2a). Results hold. Our finding is in 
line with other investigations into public opinion models on EMU related issues which 
include post 2008 data (cf. Wälti 2012, Roth et al. 2012). 
 
A further source of bias may stem from the construction of the variables NORTH and 
SOUTH. The selection of these country groups, although to a certain extent intuitive, may 
introduce the problem of simultaneous equation bias in our estimations. Specifically these 
countries were attributed group membership based on their allegedly low or high inflation 
aversion. This introduces the bias of reversed causality; inflation aversion explains group 
membership and not vice versa. To deal with the resulting potential endogeneity we use an 
instrumental variable approach (Baum et al. 2010). For this approach we need to identify 
instrumental variables. In our case, beer consumption per capita (BEER) and the number 
of olive plantations (OLIVE) are such instruments (see Appendix): they are strongly 
correlated with the country group dummies, but have no effect on individuals’ inflation 
aversion. For the main regression, the under-identification test (Kleibergen–Paap rk LM 
statistic) rejects the null hypothesis of under-identification on the 1 percent level –– the 
excluded instruments are relevant, as they are correlated with the endogenous regressors. 
We then proceed to test for endogeneity in the variable estimated with instrumental 
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variables; the results of this test show that the null cannot be rejected at the ten per cent 
level: endogeneity of the variables NORTH and SOUTH does not seem to be a problem in 
this analysis. We used the same instrumental variable approach to confirm that none of our 
included macroeconomic controls (inflation, change in GDP, unemployment, debt levels) 
are endogenous. Here we relied on lagged values as instruments and are able to confirm 




Fostering a new European ‘Stability Culture’ – that is an economic policy perspective 
whose primary concern is price stability — was the ideational element of the German 
government’s official remedy to the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis which erupted in 
2009. This forms part of a deliberate communication strategy by Christian Democrats that 
presented German Stability Culture as the source of the country’s economic success and a 
lack of said culture (as opposed to, for example, regulatory failure in the financial sector) 
as the main culprit for the Sovereign Debt Crisis (Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013). 
This narrative has pitted the allegedly prudent North against the profligate South. Our 
article challenges this crisis narrative presented by the Christian Democrats in the German 
federal government and vocally supported by the ECB (e.g., Draghi 2012) and the 
European Commission (e.g., Barroso 2011). Using Eurobarometer survey data, our study 
systematically assesses inflation aversion in the 27 EU Member States. Our results strongly 
suggest that the distinction between northern states with an allegedly strong and southern 
states with an allegedly weak Stability Culture — as expressed in high and low inflation 
aversion — is a myth.  
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Yet the promotion of Stability Culture is likely to remain in European discourse, 
irrespective of the accuracy of its associated diagnosis and the efficacy of its associated 
treatment. For German Christian Democrat politicians, the identification of solutions to the 
Eurozone’s woes in terms of fiscal austerity and price stability has been a useful shield 
against widespread criticisms of Germany’s massive current account surplus and export-
led growth model. The insistent focus on Stability Culture has also been used to legitimize 
opposition to further European integration in the form of transfer union — and to dilute a 
range of mechanisms proposed to provide financial support to Eurozone periphery 
sovereigns and banks. The ECB and the European Commission are willing promoters of 
the concept of Stability Culture due to their strongly anchored institutional responsibilities, 
and notably the ECB’s mandate of price stability and the surveillance of fiscal policies 
under the Stability and Growth Pact, the first a replication of the German Bundesbank’s 
mandate; the second a pacifier for the German electorate anxious over the loss of the 
deutschemark. The conclusions of the analysis presented in this paper encourage the 
adoption of a different discourse. Presenting the need to construct a common Stability 
Culture in the Eurozone as a panacea to the sovereign debt crisis is factually wrong. This 
discourse also undermines the legitimacy of the EMU project — by reinforcing perceptions 
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Appendix. Variable description and data source 
 
INFLATIONAVERSION: Variable is based on the question ‘What do you think are the 
two most  important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?‘What do you 
think are the two most ues’, tiftung Herbert Quandt, Washington D.C., April 15.versity of 
Göttingen.ttp://afd-berlin.eu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/01n, health care system, 
educational system,  pensions, environment protect, energy [added since 2007] others). 
For the logit models,  dummy variable, equal to 1 if inflation is mentioned, 0 otherwise; 
for the country-level model percentage of respondents in a country in a given year naming 
inflation. Source:  Eurobarometer 57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 61, 63.4, 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 
73.4. 
 
INFLATION: Based on the harmonised consumer price index (HCPI) , 2005 = 100. The 
HCPI  measures changes over time in the level of prices of goods and services, used 
and paid by  residents for consumption. The HICPs are designed for international 
comparison of consumer  price inflation. INFLATION = ((HCPI - 
l.HCPI)/l.HCPI)*100. Source: AMECO database. 
 
DEBT: General government debt as percentage of at market prices. Source: AMECO 
database. 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT: Unemployment rate, total (percentage of civilian labour force). 
Source:  AMECO database.  
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ΔGDP: Gross domestic product, constant prices (percent change). Source: AMECO 
database 
 
EDUCATION: Ordered categorical variable with nine categories corresponding to 
increasing years  of formal education. Source: Eurobarometer 57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 61, 63.4, 
65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3,  73.4. 
 
AGE: Exact age of respondent. Source: Eurobarometer 57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 61, 63.4, 65.2, 
67.2, 69.2,  71.3, 73.4. 
 
MALE: Dummy variable, equal to 1 if respondent is male, and 0 otherwise. Source: 
Eurobarometer  57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 61, 63.4, 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4. 
 
UNEMPLOYED: Dummy variable, equal to 1 if respondent is unemployed or temporarily 
not  working, and 0 otherwise. Source: Eurobarometer 57.1, 57.2, 60.1, 61, 63.4, 65.2, 
67.2, 69.2,  71.3, 73.4. 
 
EURO: Dummy variable, equal to one if country is member of the eurozone; and 0 
otherwise. 
 
TRUSTECB: Variable based on the question: ‘Do you tend to trust or tend not to trust the 
European  Central Bank?able based on the question: ‘Do you tend to trust or tend not to 




SOUTH: Dummy equal to 1 for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain; 0 otherwise. 
 
NORTH: Dummy equal to 1 for Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland; 0 
otherwise. 
 
BEER: Annual beer consumption per capita. Source: Brewers of Europe. 
 































1 Schlesinger is thought to have coined the term Stability Culture: ‘Sound money needs not 
only a stability oriented policy by central bankers and the government [...] it needs a 
Stability Culture in the public and in politics’ (Börsen-Zeitung, 1 February 1992). 
2  Hans-Olaf Henkel, the former head of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), 
suggested thus that the solution to the Debt Crisis is to be found in Germany, Finland, 
Austria and the Netherlands exiting the common currency and creating their own monetary 
union (Financial Times 29.8.2011). 
3 The Stability and Growth Pact sets budgetary rules which apply to all EU Member States. 
Specifically, in both its original and reformed versions, it stipulates a deficit to GDP 
threshold of 3 per cent and a debt level threshold of 60 per cent of GDP.  
4 This link does however exist in another country:  Greece. For an account of the Greek 
hyperinflation of 1944 and German occupation see Lazaretou (2005). 
5 Evidence from EU countries is presented in a 2007 Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 
67.2) in which respondents were asked to indicate the actual inflation rate of their country. 
It seems that knowledge about inflation is characterised by a high degree of ignorance, with 
51 per cent of the sample not being able to provide an estimate. Of those attempting an 
estimate, 93.85 per cent were wrong. In comparison, knowledge about the true 
unemployment rate was slightly better, with 8.48 per cent of respondents giving 
approximately correct answers. Interestingly, respondents in Greece displayed a greater 
knowledge about their country’s inflation rate (12.7 per cent had correct answers) than 
those in Germany (5.22 per cent had correct answers). This may be explained by the higher 
inflation rate in Greece (compared to Germany) in 2007 as well as historically higher 
inflation rates — a relationship suggested by the coefficient of the correlation between the 
percentage of respondents guessing inflation wrong and the actual inflation rate in 2007 
(n=27, r= -0.12). 
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6 Note also that the measurement of inflation aversion used in this study has as an advantage 
that the respondents are not asked to make a highly quantitative judgment of price stability 
itself. 
7 The options were:  crime, public transport, economic situation, rising prices/inflation, 
taxation, unemployment, terrorism, defense/foreign affairs, housing, immigration, health 
care system, educational system, pensions, environment protect, others. Since 2007, 
‘energy’ has been included as the penultimate option.  
8 However, one strength of our analysis in relation to others is that our measurement of 
inflation is based on one source only — Eurobarometer. Thus, our analysis avoids the 
problem of merging different data sets.  
9 Scheve’s panel is strongly unbalanced. For instance, survey results for Greece are only 
included for the year 1997. A similar caveat applies to Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2012). 
10 Data unavailability prevents us from fully analysing the impact of EMU membership as 
Eurobarometer data pre-EMU is discontinuous — the first wave of collection covered the 
1976-1993 periods and the second 2003-2006 — and the wording of the questionnaire was 
changed during the time span of the analysis. 
11 Results remain the same with Ireland excluded and Luxembourg included in these groups 
respectively. 
12 Empirical results strongly suggest that inflation expectations are the key ingredient of 
the inflationary process. Paloviita and Viren (2005) find that innovations in expectations 
account typically for more than one-third of the (forecast) variance of inflation. The main 
mechanism for this inflation expectations-inflation-loop is wages. When firms and 
employees negotiate wages and when companies set their prices, they regularly take their 
inflation expectations into account.  If inflation is expected to be high, employees might 
push for a higher wage increase, firms' costs increase, which in turn could be passed on to 
customers through higher prices. In short, inflation expectations can turn into a self-
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fulfilling prophecy; if people expect inflation, their behaviour can lead to inflation. To 
control for this we included various lags of inflation, which resulted in no substantial 
change of the results. It seems however that people’s inflation aversion is determined by 
their short-term perception of actual inflation as the magnitude of both coefficients declines 
with every lag introduced, as does its significance. 
13 The fixed-effects model controls for all time-invariant differences between the countries 
in the panel, so the estimated coefficients of the fixed-effects models cannot be biased 
because of omitted time-invariant characteristics. Time-invariant characteristics of a given 
country are collinear with the country dummies. Analysing the causes of inflation aversion 
across countries, a time-invariant characteristic, like belonging to the SOUTH cluster, 
cannot cause inflation aversion, because it is constant for each country. 
14 Trust in the ECB and inflation aversion could run both ways. On the one hand, mistrust 
in the ECB could relate positively to inflation aversion as respondents might be afraid that 
the ECB will not be able to do as good a job as the Bundesbank in tackling inflation. On 
the other hand, mistrust in the ECB might also reflect scepticism towards the ECB’s 
singular mandate of price stability and therefore relate negatively to inflation aversion.  
